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The Regulation of Human Germline Genome
Modification in the Netherlands
Britta van Beers, Charlotte de Kluiver, and Rick Maas
i introduction
When it comes to medical law and medical ethics, the Netherlands has
a reputation of being pragmatic and progressive, emphasizing values such as
tolerance, pluralism and personal autonomy.1 The Dutch legal framework for
euthanasia, which made the Netherlands the first country in the world to
legalize it, is generally regarded as a prime example of this legal and ethical
tradition.
This approach is also reflected on an academic level. Until recently, Dutch
scholars regarded self-determination as the central principle of medical law
and medical ethics. In this vein, Henk Leenen’s classic Handbook on Health
Law (Handboek gezondheidsrecht) traditionally described self-determination
not only as a central legal principle but even as a patient’s individual right.2
This focus on personal autonomy originated in the 1970s, when medical law
and medical ethics were emerging academic disciplines in the Netherlands.
In that era, a paternalistic attitude from medical professionals towards their
patients was not uncommon. To counterbalance the power of the medical
profession, Dutch legal scholars and ethicists called for the recognition of
patients’ right to self-determination. This idea proved to be influential: it was
crucial for the recognition of patients’ rights in Dutch medical contract law.
However, during the past decade, the traditional focus on self-
determination has been reconsidered. Dutch medical law and ethics scho-
lars have started to also pay attention to values and principles other than the
one of self-determination, such as the principles of protection, equality and
1 Rendtorff and Kemp, Basic Ethical Principles in European Bioethics and Biolaw (Centre for
Ethics and Law 2000) 209–216.
2 E.g. HJJ Leenen and JKM Gevers, Handboek gezondheidsrecht (4th edn, Boom Juridisch
2000) 33.
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human dignity.3 Similarly, in more recent editions of Leenen’sHandbook, self-
determination is no longer described as a right or as the cornerstone of health
law, but only as one of several guiding principles of medical law and ethics.4
How can this shift in focus be explained? One of the most important reasons
is the emergence of biomedical technologies and their accompanying regula-
tory frameworks. Indeed, consistent with emerging international regulation,
such as the Council of Europe’s Oviedo Convention (1997),5 the Dutch
legislature adopted a restrictive and prohibitive approach to biomedical tech-
nologies, as exemplified by the Embryo Act (2002)6 and other biomedical laws.
As we will discuss at length below, according to current Dutch law, human
embryos and gametes cannot be sold;7 embryos cannot be created for scientific
purposes;8 and preimplantation genetic diagnosis is only allowed under strict
conditions for very serious diseases.9 More to the point, the Embryo Act
prohibits human germline genome editing of cells with which impregnation
might take place.10
As the travaux préparatoires and explanatory memoranda to these laws make
clear, the legal restrictions and prohibitions are underpinned by values such as
respect for human life, non-commercialization and human dignity.11 The
Dutch legislature takes these principles to be of such importance that they
can outweigh other important values in these contexts, such as self-
determination and scientific progress. However, the tensions between these
principles remain. Whenever the Dutch legal order is challenged by new
biomedical developments, the tensions between these values and principles
resurface.
3 E.g. AC Hendriks, In beginsel. De gezondheidsrechtelijke beginselen uitgediept (inaugural
Leiden) (NJCM boekerij 2005); AC Hendriks, BJM Frederiks and MA Verkerk, ‘Het recht
op autonomie in samenhang met goede zorg bezien’ (Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht
2008), 2–18; BC van Beers, Persoon en lichaam in het recht. Menselijke waardigheid en
zelfbeschikking in het tijdperk van de medische biotechnologie (dissertation VU) (Boom
Juridische uitgevers 2009).
4 HJJ Leenen and others, Handboek gezondheidsrecht (6th edn, BJu 2014).
5 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights andDignity of the Human Being with Regard
to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine
(opened for signatures on 4 April 1997, entered into force 12 January 1999) ETS No. 164
(Oviedo Convention).
6 Act of 20 June 2002 Relating to the Use of Gametes and Embryos (Wet houdende regels inzake
handelingen met geslachtscellen en embryo’s) (Embryo Act).
7 E.g. Act of 24 May 1996 relating to providing Organs (Wet houdende regelen omtrent het ter
beschikking stellen van organen) (Organ Donation Act), art. 2; Embryo Act, art. 27.
8 Embryo Act, art. 24.a.
9 Ibid., arts. 26.1 and 26.2.
10 Ibid., art. 24.g.
11 See parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no 3, 3, 16, 41–49, 64.
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The rise of gene-editing tool CRISPR/Cas9 offers a striking illustration of
that dynamic. Since CRISPR/Cas9 took the life sciences by storm, human
germline genome editing has become a topic of heated debates in Dutch
politics and academia. These debates make clear that the Dutch prohibitive
approach to germline editing is under increasing pressure and that personal
autonomy and self-determination are returning to the discussion. For exam-
ple, over the past few years, several organizations, politicians and academics
have proposed to lift the ban on germline editing as soon as the technology is
safe for introduction in the clinic, with the purpose of enabling prospective
parents to use the technology for therapeutic purposes.12 In these discussions,
personal autonomy is often invoked as an important argument.13
In this chapter we first discuss the general regulatory and institutional
framework (Section II). We then focus on the most important legal provisions
within the regulation of human germline editing (Section III). Finally, we
offer an overview and analysis of current public and political debates on this
technology in the light of the tensions between self-determination and repro-
ductive autonomy on the one hand and human dignity and respect for human
life on the other (Section IV).
ii the regulatory framework
This section outlines the Dutch legal framework and the institutional envir-
onment regulating research involving human gametes and embryos. First, we
describe the broad legal framework within which research on human germ-
line genome modification takes place in the Netherlands. Subsequently, we
turn to the specific national legal framework, of which the 2002 Act Relating to
the Use of Gametes and Embryos (the Embryo Act) is the most important one.
While discussing the relevant legislation, we will also describe the relevant
regulatory authorities and advisory bodies.
1 The General Legal Framework
The broad legal framework within which research on human germline ge-
nomemodification takes place in the Netherlands comprises the Constitution
and international law as incorporated by the Constitution, including EU law,
some provisions of the Civil Code and the Criminal Code and the legal
doctrine of progressive legal protection.
12 See, in this chapter, Section IV ‘Current perspectives and future possibilities’.
13 Id.
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a The Constitution, International Law and EU Law
The Constitution of the Kingdom of Netherlands contains several provisions
regarding the place of international law (treaties, customary international law
and acts of international organizations) in the Dutch legal system.14Under the
Constitution, the Dutch government has a general obligation to ‘promote the
development of the international legal order’.15 The States General (Staten-
Generaal), the Kingdom’s bicameral Parliament, approves the ratification and
denunciation of treaties.16 Under Article 91.3, treaties that conflict with the
Constitution or lead to conflicts with it must be approved by the Houses of the
States General by two-thirds majority. Article 92 provides: ‘Legislative, execu-
tive and judicial powers may be conferred on international institutions by or
pursuant to a treaty, subject, where necessary, to the provisions of Article 91.3.’
Lastly, ratified treaties and ‘resolutions by international institutions whichmay
be binding on all persons by virtue of their contents’ have binding legal effect
within the Dutch legal system17 and displace statutory regulations in force
within the Kingdom.18
In general, the Netherlands can be regarded as a law-abidingmember of the
international community, hosting on its territory several major international
courts and tribunals. It is a member of all major international organizations,
both global and regional. It is a member of the United Nations and its
specialized agencies, including the United Nations Economic, Social and
Cultural Organization (UNESCO).Within Europe, it is also a member of the
European Union and the Council of Europe. By virtue of Article 92 of its
Constitution, binding legal instruments adopted by those organizations are
part of its national legal system.
The Netherlands ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights on 11 December 1978, which is, therefore, part of its legal
system.19 So far, it has just signed but not ratified the Optional Protocol giving
individuals access to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights to claim violations of their rights under the Covenant.20
14 Constitution of the Kingdom of the Netherlands of 24 August 1815 (Grondwet voor het
Koninkrijk der Nederlanden van 24 augustus 1815) (Constitution), arts. 93 and 94.
15 Ibid., art. 90.
16 Ibid., art. 91.
17 Ibid., art. 93.
18 Ibid., art. 94.
19 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (adopted 16December 1966,
entered into force 3 January 1976) 993 UNTS 3 (ICESCR).
20 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(adopted 10 December 2008, entered into force 5 May 2013), A/RES/63/117.
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Within the Council of Europe, as every member, the Netherlands is party to
the European Convention on Human Rights and subject to the jurisdiction of
the European Court of Human Rights.21 Among the relevant provisions of the
European Convention on Human Rights, Article 8 (the right to respect for
private and family life) deserves special mention in the context of reproductive
medicine. For over a decade, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled
that the right to private life also protects certain reproductive rights and
interests, including ‘the right to respect for both the decisions to become
and not to become a parent’,22 ‘the right of a couple to conceive a child and
tomake use of medically assisted procreation for that purpose’23 and ‘the desire
to conceive a child unaffected by [a] genetic disease [. . .] and to use assisted
reproductive technologies and PGD to this end’.24
However, the Netherlands is not party to the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights andDignity of theHuman Being with Regard to the Application
of Biology and Medicine (Oviedo Convention), even though the Netherlands
signed it already in 1997.25 In 2016, the Dutch government decided not to ratify
it, mainly because of the prohibitions contained in Article 13, which bans
human germline editing, and Article 18.2, which bans the creation of human
embryos for research purposes.26 Relying heavily on two legislative evaluation
reports,27 the government concluded that these prohibitions could hold back
further advances in reproductive medicine, more specifically research into early
embryonic development and preclinical research into safety of reproductive
techniques.28 The decision not to ratify the Oviedo Convention was heavily
criticized in Dutch legal literature.29 Some authors argued that the Convention
is a comprehensive document, with respect to patients’ rights, privacy, human
dignity, equitable access to healthcare and non-discrimination, and that by
failing to ratify it, the Netherlands had put itself outside of the international
21 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, ETS No. 5
(European Convention on Human Rights, as amended) (ECHR).
22 Evans v. United Kingdom app no 6339/05 (ECHR [Grand Chamber], 10 April 2007) para 71.
23 S.H. v. Austria app no 57813/00 (ECHR [Grand Chamber], 3 November 2011) para 82.
24 Costa & Pavan v. Italy app no 54270/10 (ECRM 28 August 2012) para 57.
25 Parliamentary document on the Embryo Act 14, 33508, 9, p. 31; 2012/13, 33508, 3, 13; 2012/13,
33400 VII, 83, 11.
26 Ibid.
27 HB Winter and others, Evaluatie Embryowet en Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting
(ZonMW 2012); E.T.M. Olsthoorn-Heim, Evaluatie Embryowet (ZonMW 2006).
28 Parliamentary document 2014/15, 34000 XVI, 106.
29 M Buijsen, ‘Ratificatie van het Biogeneeskundeverdrag: kwestie van menselijke waardigheid’
(2015) S&D 4.
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legal order on biomedicine, healthcare and ethics.30Nevertheless, as we discuss
below, the current Dutch legislation on research on human gametes and
embryos still corresponds, in large lines, with the provisions of the Oviedo
Convention, including the bans on human germline editing and on the crea-
tion of embryos for research purposes.
Finally, the Netherlands is a member of the European Union. As such, and
by virtue of Article 93 of its Constitution, it is bound by all EU legislation, as
well as case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.31 Among
relevant EU legal instruments, one must mention Regulation 536/2014,32 on
the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct of clinical trials
onmedicinal products for human use, and Regulation 1394/2007, on advanced
therapy medicinal products.33
b The Civil Code and Criminal Code
The Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek)34 and the Criminal Code (Wetboek van
Strafrecht)35 contain provisions that must be taken into account when discuss-
ing the general legal framework for the regulation of acts affecting embryos
and fetuses in the Netherlands. Article 1.2 of the Civil Code states: ‘A child of
which a woman is pregnant, is regarded to have been born already as often as
its interests require so. If it is born lifeless, it is deemed to have never existed.’
This legal fiction, known as the ‘nasciturus fiction’, dates back to Roman law
and many European legal orders of the Romano-Germanic tradition have
incorporated it in their civil codes. It does not imply legal personhood of
unborn life, nor does it aim to determine the legal status of various types of
unborn human life. Instead, once the child is born, one may, for the purposes
of the law, act as if the child was born at an earlier moment than it actually was,
30 JCJ Dute, ‘Buiten de (mensenrechten)orde? Over het niet ratificeren van het
Biogeneeskundeverdrag door Nederland’ (2015) Magazine for Health law (TVG) 39, 394, at
401; COGEM/Health Council of the Netherlands, Editing Human DNA: Moral and Social
Implications of Germline Genetic Modification (Bilthoven 2017), p. 42.
31 Case C-26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR; Case C-6/64 Costa/ENEL [1964] ECR.
32 On EU laws regulating human germline genome modification, see, in this volume, Part 2,
Section II, Chapter 6. EU Regulation No 536/2014 of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 16 April 2014 on clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, and repealing
Directive 2001/20/EC Text with EEA relevance, OJ L 158, 27.5.2014,1–76.
33 EC Regulation No 1394/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council of
13 November 2007 on advanced therapy medicinal products and amending Directive 2001/
83/EC and Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 (Text with EEA relevance), OJ L 324, 10.12.2007,
121–137.
34
1992 New Dutch Civil Code (Nieuw Burgerlijk Wetboek van 1992) (Civil Code).
35 Criminal Code of 3 March 1881 (Wetboek van Strafrecht van 3 maart 1881) (Criminal Code).
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if ‘its interests require so’. In other words, the nasciturus fiction is used to
protect several legal interests of an already born child. For instance, in
accordance with its Roman law roots, Article 1.2 of the Civil Code is most
commonly invoked for the purposes of inheritance law, to enable a child to be
recognized as the beneficiary of an inheritance, even if the child was not born
yet at the time of the deceased’s death. More to the point, recently, the legal
fiction has been used to justify prenatal child protective measures, giving rise
to much discussion among legal scholars, as this new interpretation does seem
to imply prenatal protection.36 Another example is the discussion about the
duty of care of healthcare providers towards unborn human life. In 2005, the
Dutch Supreme Court was confronted with the question whether an embryo
can be considered a ‘patient’ under Dutch law. The Court ruled that this
could be the case if the embryo is in vivo and the pregnant woman has
explicitly entered into a treatment contract on behalf of her unborn child on
the basis of the Civil Code.37
The Criminal Code is relevant mainly because of the criminal law provi-
sions on abortion. According to Article 82.a of the Criminal Code: ‘taking the
life of a person or of an infant at birth or shortly afterwards shall include: the
killing of a fetus which might reasonably be expected to have the potential to
survive outside the mother’.38 In other words, once a fetus has reached the
stage when it could survive outside the womb (the so-called viability limit),
abortion is a crime. This criminal law provision has led to the enactment of the
1981 Termination of Pregnancy Act (Wet Afbreking Zwangerschap). According
to the Act, abortion can be performed by a certified clinic or hospital at any
point between conception and viability, which was originally set to be at 24
weeks of the pregnancy.39 Although medical technology has advanced in the
meantime, making it possible to keep children alive who are born already after
22 weeks of pregnancy,40 in 2011, the Minister of Health decided that the
36 P Vlaardingerbroek and others, Het hedendaagse personen- en familierecht (Deventer 2011),
pp. 26–27; See, for an interesting analysis of both this judicial interpretation and the ensuing
academic discussions, LT Haaf, ‘Unborn and Future Children as New Legal Subjects: An
Evaluation of Two Subject-Oriented Approaches – The Subject of Rights and the Subject of
Interests’, 18 German Law Journal 5, 1091–1119.
37 Baby Kelly [2005] Dutch Supreme Court, ECLI: NL: HR: 2005: AR5213.
38 Translation provided by Legislationline, ‘Criminal Codes: Netherlands’ www
.legislationline.org/documents/section/criminal-codes/country/12/Netherlands/show
accessed 26 October 2018.
39 Act of 1May 1981 concerning regulations on the termination of pregnancy [Wet van 1mei 1981,
houdende regelen met betrekking tot het afbreken van zwangerschap].
40 A Reerink, ‘Wel/niet levensvatbaar’ (NRC Handelsblad, 3 februari 2011) www.nrc.nl/nieuws/
2011/02/03/welniet-levensvatbaar-11993573-a427619 accessed 26 October 2018.
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traditional limit of 24 weeks would be maintained.41 During the first 24 weeks,
themother can request abortion, but only within the limits of the Termination
of Pregnancy Act.42 Abortion outside the limits established by the Termination
of Pregnancy Act and after viability is a crime punished under Article 82.a of
the Criminal Code.
In sum, within Dutch law, and the Dutch Civil Code and Criminal Code
in particular, embryos and fetuses are not regarded as legal subjects with
independent legal rights. However, unborn human life, even in its earliest
stages, is not treated as just a legal object either.
c The Legal Doctrine of Progressive Legal Protection
Dutch health law scholars have developed the legal doctrine of ‘progressive
legal protection’ as a theoretical framework to explain the legal status of
unborn life.43 It posits that as unborn life develops over time, it becomes
increasingly worthy of legal protection. There are several embryonic develop-
ment phases that are deemed legally relevant.
The first phase, between fertilization (either in utero or in vitro) and
nidation (i.e. the organic process whereby a fertilized egg becomes implanted
in the lining of the uterus of placental mammals), is called the status poten-
tialis. At this early stage, the guarantees and requirements of the Termination
of Pregnancy Act do not apply yet.44 Moreover, the Embryo Act makes it clear
that during this early phase, the interests and values of others (e.g. patients who
might benefit from research, or the parents) can outweigh those of the
embryos in vitro.45
The second phase is the status nascendi, which starts once nidation is
completed.46 Within the status nascendi phase, because of the aforementioned
criminal law provisions relating to abortion, one can distinguish two separate sub-
41 ‘Abortusgrens blijft staan op 24 weken’ (Volkskrant, 19 April 2011) www.volkskrant.nl/mensen/
abortusgrens-blijft-staan-op-24-weken~bbbf9c18/ accessed 26 October 2018.
42 TPA, art. 2–5.
43 HJJ Leenen and others, Handboek gezondheidsrecht (6th edn, BJu 2014) 139; AM te Braake,
‘De juridische status van het embryo: een stevig aangemeerde leer’ (1995) 19: 2 Tijdschrift voor
Gezondheidsrecht 32.
44 Termination of Pregnancy Act, art. 1.2.
45 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no 3, 5 (Explanatory
memorandum).
46 According to Leenen’s Handbook on Health Law, nidation constitutes the beginning of
pregnancy, although this remains contested among health law scholars. HJJ Leenen and
others,Handboek gezondheidsrecht (6th edn, BJu 2014), s 4.3.2; W van der Burg, ‘De juridische
“status” van het embryo: een op drift geraakte fictie’ (1994) 7 Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht
386, 386–401.
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stages: before and after viability.47 During this phase, the embryo still does not
have the status of a legal subject. This remains the case even when the embryo is
beyond the viability limit and abortion is no longer allowed.
The doctrine of progressive legal protection explains some features of the
Dutch regulatory framework with regard to unborn life, such as the difference in
legal protection before and after the viability limit. However, recent technolo-
gical developments have created dilemmas that cannot be adequately resolved
by resorting to the idea of progressive legal protection. The Embryo Act created
various categories of embryos and fetuses with various legal regimes of protec-
tion that cannot be explained in terms of different stages in biological develop-
ment. For example, the Embryo Act created different regimes of protection for
embryos in vitro that are intended to be implanted for pregnancy and for those
that are not.48 It also distinguishes between embryos that are left over from IVF
treatments and embryos that were deliberately created for research purposes, an
act that is prohibited. As theMinister of Health stated during the parliamentary
discussions that led up to the Embryo Act: ‘To us the intention with which
embryos are created are decisive for the degree to which acts with embryos are to
be permitted.’49 Accordingly, several legal scholars argue that the doctrine of
progressive legal protection has severe limitations50 and fails to offer a satisfying
theoretical framework to explain the status of embryos in an era of biomedical
technologies.51 In sum, the Embryo Act demonstrates that not only the stage of
biological developmentmatters for the Dutch legal framework surrounding acts
with embryos and fetuses but also the intentions with which these entities were
created and the circumstances in which they were placed.52
2 The Specific Regulatory Framework
a The Embryo Act
The Act Relating to the Use of Gametes and Embryos (Wet houdende regels
inzake handelingen met geslachtscellen en embryo’s), better known as ‘the
47 HJJ Leenen and others, Handboek gezondheidsrecht (6th edn, BJu 2014) 134.
48 Embryo Act, arts. 16 and 10 respectively.
49 Parliamentary document Handelingen II 2001/02, 336.
50 W van der Burg, ‘De juridische “status” van het embryo: een op drift geraakte fictie’ (1994) 7
Tijdschrift voor Gezondheidsrecht 386, 386–401.
51 BC van Beers, ‘De mysterieuze status van het embryo’ (2005) 13 Nederlands Juristenblad 678,
678–685; BC van Beers, Persoon en lichaam in het recht. Menselijke waardigheid en zelf-
beschikking in het tijdperk van de medische biotechnologie (dissertation VU) (Boom Juridische
uitgevers 2009) 244–250.
52 Ibid.
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Embryo Act’, is the most important national law with respect to research with
human embryos. As its official name makes clear, it regulates the use of both
human embryos and gametes. It was adopted on 20 June 2002, after a long
deliberative and legislative process. The bill was drafted under a government
consisting of political parties with different political outlooks: a conservative
liberal political party (VVD), a liberal-democratic party (D66) and the labour
party (PvdA). Policy formation under this government was a balancing act,
and it shows in the Embryo Act.53
The Embryo Act strikes a difficult balance between, on the one hand, limit-
ing the use of embryos for research or medical purposes in accordance with the
principles of human dignity and respect for human life, and, on the other hand,
supporting scientific research to promote the health of those who are ill and the
welfare of infertile couples.54 Moreover, the Explanatory Memorandum men-
tions the welfare of the future child as an important perspective that was taken
into consideration by the legislator. Thus, the overarching idea underlying the
Embryo Act is that respect for human life and dignity calls for caution and
restraint when human embryos are involved.55 Even if instrumental use of
embryos is allowed, embryos still have a certain special legal standing that
distinguishes them from mere objects. Therefore, embryos can only be used
for certain purposes and under strict conditions. As the Explanatory
Memorandum to the Embryo Act explains: ‘Exactly because we give much
weight to the principle of respect for human life, we subject the use of gametes
and embryos to certain conditions and restrictions, and restrict the purposes for
which gametes and embryos may be used.’56
The Act defines an ‘embryo’ as a ‘cell or coherent whole of cells with the
capacity to grow into a human being’.57 A fertilized egg certainly qualifies as
such. However, how this definition relates to other embryo-like entities
remains unclear. For instance, as the Act is worded, the creation of human–
animal hybrids and synthetic embryos, as long as they do not have ‘the capacity
to grow into a human being’, does not fall under the scope of this law.
Although some have bemoaned the vagueness of the definition of embryo,58
it is not unlike, nor certainly less precise than, the one provided for by the
53 BC van Beers, ‘De mysterieuze status van het embryo’ (2005) 13 Nederlands Juristenblad
678, 683.




57 Embryo Act, art. 1.c.
58 HB Winter and others, Evaluatie Embryowet en Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting
(ZonMW 2012); E.T.M. Olsthoorn-Heim, Evaluatie Embryowet (ZonMW 2006).
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legislation of several other states around the world. The definition of ‘fetus’
contained in the Embryo Act is more peculiar: an ‘embryo in the human
body’.59 In this chapter, however, we use the term ‘embryo’ to refer to all types
of unborn life, both in vitro and in vivo.
The Act permits, under strict conditions, the scientific use of embryos that
are left over after an IVF treatment (so-called surplus embryos), but, in any
event, not beyond 14 days after fertilization.60 The creation of embryos for
research is prohibited.61 The first condition is consent of the individuals who
underwent the fertility treatment.62 Article 8 limits the range of options that
these individuals have when choosing the destiny of the surplus embryos: they
can donate them to others who wish to become pregnant (par. 1.a); to scientists
for research (par. 1.b and c); or they can opt for destruction (par. 3).63 A second
requirement is that research on embryos must take place in accordance with
a protocol that provides a complete description of the planned research.64 The
research protocol must be approved by a national oversight body called the
Central Committee on Research Involving Human Subjects before the scien-
tific research involving the surplus embryos can move forward.65 A similar
procedure applies to research involving ‘fetuses’66 and gametes.67
We will discuss how the Embryo Act regulates human germline editing in
more detail below.68 For now, it suffices to say that it prohibits germline
modification of nuclear DNA for reproductive purposes,69 reproductive
cloning,70 sex selection71 and bringing together human and animal gametes
for the purpose of creating a hybrid.72 Finally, it bans selling embryos and
gametes.73 In case of violation of these prohibitions, the Act provides for
criminal sanctions varying from a fine to imprisonment.74
59 Embryo Act, art. 1.d.
60 Ibid., art. 25.b.
61 Ibid., art. 24.a.
62 Ibid., art. 8.
63 Ibid., art. 24.c, prohibiting using embryos for purposes other than the ones mentioned in
Article 8.
64 Ibid., art. 3.1.
65 For more information about this committee, see infra Section II.2.c.
66 Embryo Act, art. 3.3.
67 Ibid., art. 3.1.
68 See, in this chapter, Section III, ‘Substantive Provisions’.
69 Embryo Act, art. 24.g.
70 Ibid., art. 24.f.
71 Ibid., art. 26.1.
72 Ibid., art. 25.a.
73 Ibid., art. 27.
74 Ibid., arts. 28 and 29 sanctioned with a prison sentence of one year maximum.
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b Regulation Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 2009
In the Netherlands, preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) is only allowed
for couples that are at a high risk of giving birth to children with a severe,
hereditary disorder. The legal framework consists of a general law, the Special
Medical Procedures Act (Wet op de Bijzondere Medische Verrichtingen), that
allows for the creation of administrative decrees to regulate certain special
medical procedures, such as PGD.75 For PGD the following decree is currently
in force: Regulation Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis 2009.76 Based on this
decree, the PGD National Indications Committee (Landelijke
Indicatiecommissie PGD) was called into existence to draft guidelines on the
question as to which genetic disorders are serious enough to justify PGD.77
Section 2 of the SpecialMedical Procedures Act gives the power to theMinistry
of Public Health to license permits to hospitals to perform PGD. So far, only the
Maastricht University Medical Centre has been licensed to do so.
c Medical Research on Human Subjects Act, the Central Committee
on Research Involving Human Subjects, and the Minister
of Health, Welfare and Sport
The Medical Research on Human Subjects Act (Wet medisch-
wetenschappelijk onderzoek met mensen − WMO), adopted in 1998, regulates
medical research on human subjects.78 It establishes various regulatory
bodies, including the Central Committee on Research Involving Human
Subjects (centrale commissie voor medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek),79 the
governmental body in charge of implementing the Medical Research on
Human Subjects Act as well as the Embryo Act.80 It is composed of up to 15
doctors and persons who are experts in the field of embryology, pharmacology,
pharmacy, nursing, behavioural sciences, legal science, the methodology of
scientific research and ethics, as well as a person who specifically assesses the
scientific research from the perspective of the subject.81
75 Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis.
76
2009 Regulation Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis (Regeling preı̈mplantatie genetische
diagnostiek) (Regulation PFD) 2009.
77 PGD, ‘What is PGD?: PGD National Indications Committee’ (PGD Nederland) www
.pgdnederland.nl/en/pgd-national-indications-committee accessed 26 October 2018.
78 Act of 26February 1998, regarding rules onmedical scientific research on humans (Wet van 25
februari 1998, houdende regelen inzake medisch-wetenschappelijk onderzoek met mensen).
79 Medical Research Act, art. 14.
80 https://english.ccmo.nl, accessed 24 November 2018.
81 Medical Research Act, art. 14.
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All research that falls under the scope of the Medical Research on Human
Subjects Act or the Embryo Act must be reviewed by the Central Committee.
The Central Committee protects subjects taking part in medical research by
reviewing the research against the statutory provisions and taking into account
the interests of medical progress. The Central Committee reports to the
Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport.82 The Minister can suspend research
on human subjects in case of unacceptable risks for the research subjects’
health.83 In case of scientific research on medicine concerning gene therapy,
somatic cell therapy, xenogeneic cell therapy or medicine that contains
genetically modified organisms (GMOs), research is only allowed after expli-
cit consent of the Minister and/or the Central Committee.84
The Central Committee also reports annually to the Minister of Health on
the application of the Embryo Act ‘with special attention being paid to new
developments concerning actions involving germ cells and embryos, insofar as
these are apparent from the submitted research protocols’.85 The Minister of
Health sends their annual report to the two chambers of the States General
and gives its opinion on the new developments identified by the Central
Committee.86
d The Environmental Management Act and the Commission
on Genetic Modification
The Environmental Management Act (Wet Milieubeheer) was adopted in
1979 to govern general subjects of environmental protection.87 It establishes
many bodies, the most relevant for this chapter being the Commission on
Genetic Modification (Commissie genetische modificatie − COGEM).88 The
Commission is composed of 20 members, appointed by the Minister of
Infrastructure and Water Management. It operates under the umbrella of
the Ministry of Health. It advises the Minister of Health on notifications and
applications for a licence relating to the production of or activities involving
GMOs and on safety measures to be taken to protect public health and the
82 Embryo Act, art. 4.
83 Medical Research Act, art. 3.a.
84 Ibid., art. 13i.4.
85 Embryo Act, art. 4.1.
86 Ibid., art. 4.2.
87 Act of 13 June 1979 regarding rules on several general topics relating to environmental hygiene
(Wet van 13 juni 1979, houdende regelen met betrekking tot een aantal algemene onderwerpen
op het gebied van milieuhygiëne) (Environmental Management Act) [amended last in 2018],
preamble.
88 Environmental Management Act, art. 2.26.
Regulation of Human Germline Genome Modification in Netherlands 321
use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108759083.012
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Universitá di Torino, on 26 Nov 2019 at 16:39:47, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of
environment.89 It advises the administrative authority authorized to approve
licences relating to research establishments working on GMOs.90 It also
advises the administrative authority in charge of monitoring the production
of or activities involving GMOs on matters related to its monitoring tasks.91
And, finally, it informs the relevant ministers when the production of or
activities involving GMOs have ethical or social implications which the
Commission considers to be important.92
e The Health Act and the Health Council
The Health Act (Gezondheidswet) was adopted in 1956 and is the general
statute regulating public health in the Netherlands.93 It establishes the Health
Council (Gezondheidsraad), an advisory body composed of about 100 mem-
bers, appointed by the Crown and operating under the umbrella of the
Ministry of Health.94 Government ministers can use the advice of the
Health Council to substantiate policy decisions.95 The Health Council
informs the Minister of Health, Welfare and Sport periodically of the current
state of public health and health-related research.96 The Health Council also
has an independent and ‘alerting’ function: it can give unsolicited advice97 by
issuing advisory reports on health-related scientific developments.98
3 Funding
In the Netherlands, research on gene editing and human embryos is publicly
funded by two organizations: the Netherlands Organization for Scientific
Research (Nederlandse Organisatie voor Wetenschappelijk Onderzoek –
NWO)99 and the Organization Health Research Netherlands (Organisatie
89 Environmental Management Act, art. 2.27.1.a.
90 Environmental Management Act, art. 2.27.1.b.
91 Environmental Management Act, art. 2.27.1.c.
92 Environmental Management Act, art. 2.27.2.
93 Act of 18 January 1956, on new legal regulations on the organization of health care (Wet van 18
januari 1956, houdende nieuwe wettelijke voorschriften met betrekking tot de organisatie van de
gezondheidszorg) (Health Act) [amended last in 2018].
94 Health Act, art. 21.
95 Health Act, art. 22.
96 Ibid.
97 Website Health Council: www.healthcouncil.nl/task-en-procedure/legal-task, accessed
24 November 2018.
98 Website Health Council: www.healthcouncil.nl/task-en-procedure/independence, accessed
24 November 2018.
99 NWO (2018) www.nwo.nl accessed 7 November 2018.
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ZorgOnderzoek Nederland – ZON).100 The NWO was established in 1987 by
the Act on the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (Wet op de
Nederlandse organisatie voor wetenschappelijk onderzoek).101 Its task is further-
ing the quality of scientific research and stimulating new developments in
scientific research in general.102The ZON focuses specifically on research and
development in the fields of health, prevention and care. It was established in
1998 by the Act on the Organization of Health Research in the Netherlands
(Wet op de organisatie ZorgOnderzoek Nederland).103
Funding for health research comes from the Netherlands Organization for
Health Research and Development (Nederlandse organisatie voor gezondheid-
sonderzoek en zorginnovatie),104 an organization in which NWO and ZON
collaborate. ZonMw is tasked to solve problems and challenges in health care
and research and promote the actual use of scientific knowledge.105Currently,
no research into human gene editing is funded in the Netherlands by either
NWO or Horizon 2020.106
iii substantive provisions
Having presented the regulatory environment in general terms, it is now
possible to explain the Dutch legal rules on germline genome modification.
For the regulation of human genome germline editing, two provisions of the
Embryo Act are essential: the prohibition on creating human embryos for
research (Article 24.a) and the prohibition on genetically modifying human
embryos and gametes (Article 24.g). These prohibitions mirror the prohibi-
tions contained in Articles 18.2 and 13 of the Oviedo Convention, even though
the Netherlands has not ratified it.
100 ZonMw (2018) www.zonmw.nl accessed 7 November 2018.
101 Act of 7 July 1987 on the regulation of theDutchOrganization of Scientific Research (Wet van
7 juli 1987, houdende herziene regeling van de Nederlandse organisatie voor zuiver-
wetenschappelijk onderzoek) (Act on the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research)
[amended last in 2017].
102 NWO Act, art. 3.1.
103 Act of 14 February 1998, on the Act on the Organization of Health Research in the
Netherlands (Wet van 14 februari 1998) (Act on the Organization of Health Research in the
Netherlands) [amended last in 2011]; ZON Act, art. 2.1.
104 ZonMw, ‘ZonMw in the Netherlands’ (ZonMw 2018) www.zonmw.nl/en/about-zonmw/zo
nmw-in-the-netherlands/ accessed 24 October 2018.
105 ZonMw in English (2018) www.zonmw.nl/en/ accessed 7 November 2018.
106 According to the latest project lists on: European Commission, ‘Examples of EU funded
projects’ (European Commission) http://ec.europa.eu/budget/euprojects/search-projects_en
last accessed 7 November 2018 and NWO, ‘Research & Results’ (NWO 2018) www.nwo.nl
/en/research-and-results accessed on 7 November 2018.
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1 The Prohibition to Create Human Embryos for Research Purposes
Research on embryos can be done with surplus embryos if certain conditions
are met, namely: (i) the research must be likely to lead to new insights in the
field of medical science;107 (ii) it cannot be conducted in any another manner
but by using surplus embryos;108 (iii) its methodology must be convincing;109
(iv) the donor couple must give informed and written consent, after
a ‘sufficient time of reflection’;110 (v) cells grown from an embryo, as well as
reproductive cells and embryos, cannot be used for purposes other than those
for which they may be made available;111 and (vi) the embryo must not be
allowed to develop outside the human body for more than 14 days.112
However, scientists cannot create embryos for research purposes. Article 24.
a of the Embryo Act prohibits ‘deliberately creating embryos and using
deliberately created embryos for scientific research and other purposes than
initiating a pregnancy’. The ban is phrased in such a way that Dutch scientists
are also not allowed to import and use embryos that have been created for
research purposes abroad, as confirmed by the Explanatory Memorandum of
the Embryo Act.113 As will be discussed below, this prohibition forms the main
legal obstacle for research involving human germline editing.
It should be noted that the legislator had in mind at least four considerations
when drafting the ban. The first was the need to respect human life, demanded
both by the Dutch legal system and by prevailing societal attitudes. According to
the government, ‘the creation of embryos for research purposes constitutes a graver
interference with the principle of respect for human life than in case of using
embryos that already existed, such as embryos that are left over from IVF’.114
The second was the need to ensure that scientific research is not unduly
hindered.115 The third was taking into consideration the views on the matter of
the public. The government observed in that context ‘that, outside scientifically
oriented circles, there hardly is public support within society for the creation of
embryos for scientific purposes’.116 And, finally, the fourth was keeping the
107 Embryo Act, art. 10.a; Medical Research (Human Subjects) Act, arts. 14.1 and 16.
108 Embryo Act, art. 10.b; Medical Research (Human Subjects) Act, arts. 14.1 and 16.
109 Embryo Act, art. 10.c.
110 Embryo Act, art. 8; Medical Research (Human Subjects) Act, arts. 14.1 and 16.
111 Embryo Act, arts. 24.d and 24.h.
112 Embryo Act, art. 24.e; Medical Research (Human Subjects) Act, arts. 14.1 and 16.
113 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no 3, 57–58 (Explanatory
memorandum).
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Netherlands in line with prevailing international and European standards.117 At
the time, only the United Kingdom permitted creating embryos for research
purposes.
At the same time, the government underlined that scientific and societal
developments in this field usually take place at a rapid pace. To enable the
Embryo Act to respond to these developments, the ban on the creation of embryos
for other purposes than a pregnancy should, according to the government, not be
written in stone. Therefore, the ban can be lifted by mere Royal Decree, an act of
the government that does not require a parliamentary vote.118 Should that day
arrive, the government has alreadymade it clear that it will follow the so-called not
allowed, unless approach,119 namely, embryos will not be created ad hoc for
research unless: (i) the scientific research leads to new and fundamental insights
in infertility, artificial reproduction, transplantation medicine, or hereditary or
congenital disorders; (ii) the specific research cannot be conducted without creat-
ing embryos, for example by using surplus embryos from IVF;120 and (iii) the same
requirements already in place for research on surplus embryos are met.121
2 The Ban on Human Germline Genetic Modification
Article 24.g of the Embryo Act prohibits ‘deliberately modifying the genetic
material of the nucleus of human germ cells with which a pregnancy will be
established’.122 These words suggest that human genetic modification is prohib-
ited only for reproductive purposes, and only where nuclearDNA is concerned.
In other words, Article 24.g does not prohibit research on germline editing. It also
does not prohibit modification ofmitochondrialDNA for either reproductive or
research purposes. Therefore, in theory, scientists in the Netherlands can
modify the genome of both human embryos and gametes for research purposes.
Moreover, the technology of so-called human nuclear genome transfer123 (also
117 Ibid. 27–28.
118 Embryo Act, art. 33(2).
119 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no 3, 30 (Explanatory
memorandum).
120 See first draft of the Embryo Act, art. 11 (Parliamentary documentKamerstukken II 2000/01, 27
423, no 1–2).
121 Embryo Act, arts. 5, 6 and 7.
122 Emphasis added.
123 Nuclear genome transfer is a procedure that can be used to prevent passing on mitochondrial
diseases to future children in the following way: one removes the nuclear DNA from eggs that
originate from a woman with dysfunctional mitochondrial DNA and transfers the resulting
nuclear DNA into the enucleated eggs from a third party who donated her eggs for this
procedure.
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known as ‘mitochondrial replacement therapy’)124 is not explicitly prohibited,
even for reproductive purposes.
However, even though the Embryo Act does not explicitly prohibit scien-
tific research involving human germline editing or nuclear genome transfer,
the prohibition of the creation of human embryos for research contained in
Article 24.a makes this kind of research practically impossible. As Dutch
scientists have emphasized repeatedly, surplus embryos cannot be used for
this kind of research; it takes embryos that have been created ad hoc.125 As
a result, the Embryo Act contains, what could be called, a de facto prohibition
on research in the field of human germline editing, since the creation of
research embryos is indispensable for the most important types of research in
this field.
What the Embryo Act does not prohibit, de jure or de facto, is research
involving human germline editing or nuclear genome transfer that does not
involve the creation of embryos for research purposes, such as editing the
nuclear DNA of gametes for research purposes. Additionally, the Embryo Act,
at least in theory, does not impede the introduction of nuclear genome transfer
in clinical contexts. In practice, this will not be authorized, as long as research
involving nuclear genome transfer cannot take place in the Netherlands. This
was confirmed by the Dutch Minister of Health in answer to questions from
Members of Parliament about the technology.126
Originally, the ban on human germline editing was repealable through
a simple Royal Decree, just like the prohibition of the creation of embryos for
research.127 However, in response to the EU Clinical Trials Directive, which
states that ‘no gene therapy trials may be carried out which result in modifica-
tions to the subject’s germ line genetic identity’,128 and which came into force
during the parliamentary discussion of the Act, the government changed its
124 We agree with Baylis that the term ‘mitochondrial replacement’ is misleading, and will
therefore, like the Dutch Health Council and COGEM (see COGEM/Health Council of
the Netherlands, Editing Human DNA: Moral and Social Implications of Germline Genetic
Modification (Bilthoven 2017)), use the term ‘nuclear genome transfer’ instead (see F Baylis,
‘Human Nuclear Genome Transfer (So-Called Mitochondrial Replacement): Clearing the
Underbrush’ (January 2017) 31:1 Bioethics 7, 7–19.
125 As evidenced in a report commissioned by the Dutch government: J Eeuwijk and others,
Onderzoek naar speciaal kweken, (Pallas 2015).
126 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 29 323, no 105, 12–13.
127 See first draft of the Embryo Act, art. 32.3 (parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01,
27 423, no 1–2).
128 Article 9.6 of Directive 2001/20/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of
4 April 2001 on the approximation of the laws, regulations and administrative provisions
of the Member States relating to the implementation of good clinical practice in the conduct
of clinical trials on medicinal products for human use, [2001] OJ L 121, 34–44.
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mind and amended the text of the proposed law accordingly.129 As a result,
a parliamentary vote is now needed in order to lift the ban on germline
modification.
In its Explanatory Memorandum, the government stressed the need for
further ethical reflection on human germline modification. Questions
that need to be addressed include ‘the question whether human dignity
implies the right to inherit a genetic pattern that has not been modified
as a result of intentional human interventions, or that germline therapy
would, on the contrary, be required by that same principle’.130
Furthermore, the government mentioned the irreversibility of human
germline modification and the possible risk that human diversity would
decrease as a result. Nevertheless, the government raised these questions
without offering any answers. When it came to, for example, the ban on
reproductive cloning, contained in Article 24.f of the Embryo Act, the
government was much more outspoken: ‘we completely share the funda-
mental argument that cloning human individuals violates human
dignity’.131
iv current perspectives and future possibilities
As discussed in the previous section, two bans dominate the national legisla-
tive and policy framework for human germline editing: the ban on intention-
ally modifying the genetic material of the nucleus of human germline cells for
reproductive purposes and the ban on the creation of embryos for research
purposes. So far, political debates in Parliament have tended to focus on the
latter. The rise of CRISPR/Cas9 gave new impetus to the debate, but the issue
has so far remained unresolved. A change of government in September 2017,
with a different position on medical-ethical issues than the previous govern-
ment, has further complicated the discussion.132 A discussion of the debate will
shed light on current perspectives and future possibilities for the evolution of
the regulatory framework for embryo research and human germline genome
modification in the Netherlands.
129 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no 5, 99–100.
130 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2000/01, 27 423, no 3, 45 (Explanatory
memorandum).
131 Ibid. 42.
132 The previous government consisted of a conservative liberal political party (VVD) and the
labour party (PvdA). The current government consists of a conservative liberal political party
(VVD), a liberal-democratic party (D66), a center-right Christian-democratic party (CDA)
and another Christian-democratic party (ChristenUnie).
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Following up on the findings and recommendations of two evaluation studies
on the Embryo Act that had been published since this legislation came into
force,133 in May 2016, the Minister of Health, Mrs Edith Schippers, sent a letter
to Parliament proposing to lift the ban on creating embryos for research.134
According to Schippers, who is a prominent member of the People’s Party for
Freedom and Democracy (Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie − VVD),
a conservative-liberal political party, important scientific research is hindered by
the prohibition. The Minister proposed to lift the ban only for some types of
research. She stressed that, although the principle of respect for human life is an
important one, other interests should also be taken into account. Through
a revision of the Embryo Act, she aimed to offer relief to ‘infertile couples and
couples who risk passing on hereditary diseases to their offspring’. Describing
her approach to research embryos as a ‘not allowed, unless’ policy,135 she
proposed to replace the existing blanket ban with a provision that allows the
creation of embryos for certain types of research under certain conditions:
1. the research must be designed to generate new insights in the field of
infertility, assisted reproductive technologies and hereditary or congeni-
tal deficiencies and must be directly relevant to clinical practice;
2. the research cannot be performed by using surplus embryos;
3. the research design and research activities must meet the relevant quality
standards for scientific research;
4. the medical objective must outweigh the objections to creating embryos
specifically for scientific research.136
In her letter, she identified three types of research that would fulfil these
conditions: in vitro maturation (IVM), in vitro gametogenesis (IVG) and
nuclear genome transfer (NGT). The 2016 letter to Parliament made head-
lines, received much media attention and led to diverging reactions.137 In
133 HB Winter and others, Evaluatie Embryowet en Wet donorgegevens kunstmatige bevruchting
(ZonMW 2012); E.T.M. Olsthoorn-Heim, Evaluatie Embryowet (ZonMW 2006). Schippers
had commissioned an inquiry into the matter. The resulting report had concluded that the
legal ban on the creation of embryos for research purposes hampered clinically relevant
developments in the field of medical technologies. J Eeuwijk and others, Onderzoek naar
speciaal kweken (Pallas 2015) 15.
134 Parliamentary document 2015/16, 29 323, no 101.
135 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2015/16, 29 323, no 101, 4.
136 Ibid. 5.
137 Eg G de Wert, ‘Embryowet blijft te beperkt’, (NRC Handelsblad, 31May 2016) www.nrc.nl/nieu
ws/2016/05/31/embryowet-blijft-te-beperkt-1623987-a557164 accessed 7 November 2018; BC
van Beers, ‘Debat over embryo’s hoort op hoogste politieke niveau’ (Volkskrant, 2 June 2016)
www.volkskrant.nl/columns-opinie/debat-over-embryowet-hoort-op-hoogste-politieke-niveau~b5
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a subsequent 2017 letter to the Parliament,138 she also added human germline
genome editing to the list. The 2017 letter made clear that Schippers consid-
ered human germline genome editing viable as soon as it is proven safe for
clinical applications. However, to prove safety, clinical research is needed,
and, according to her, this research should take place also in the Netherlands.
Thus, she proposed to include germline genome editing in the list of types of
research for which the ban on creating embryos should be lifted. TheMinister
stressed the importance of a public debate on the matter, although, in her
view, it should focus on the question as to how to regulate the use of this
technology, and not as to whether this technology is desirable in the first place.
Indeed, she was ‘optimistic that a regulatory framework – comparable to the
existing regulatory framework for preimplantation genetic diagnostics
(PGD) – could work well and could warrant that only morally and socially
acceptable applications of germline modification would take place’.139 As
discussed, in the Netherlands, PGD is permitted only for serious hereditary
diseases. Apparently, according to Schippers, human germline modification
does not raise additional issues compared to PGD, apart from the safety issues.
TheMinister’s position is that human germline editing should be available for
prospective parents as soon as the technology no longer poses any health risks,
and as long as it is only used for the elimination of serious hereditary diseases.
Barely a month later, the Dutch Health Council and the Netherlands
Commission on Genetic Modification issued a joint advisory report on
human germline genetic modification with exactly the same recommenda-
tion: lift the ban on creating embryos for research and on human germline
genomemodification for therapeutic purposes as soon as the technology is safe
for introduction in the clinic.140 In the report’s chapter on the ethical dimen-
sions of the issue, the two bodies discussed the ethical concerns about produ-
cing embryos for research, instead of using surplus embryos. The Netherlands
Commission on Genetic Modification and Health Council argued that the
fear of ‘instrumentalization’ of embryos could not justify a blanket ban on
creating embryos for research. They emphasized that germline modification
b712fb/ accessed7November 2018;WDondorp,GdeWert andSRepping, ‘Instrumenteel gebruik
van embryo’s is al lang geaccepteerd’ (Volkskrant, 9 June 2016) www.volkskrant.nl/col
umns-opinie/instrumenteel-gebruik-van-embryo-s-is-allang-geaccepteerd~b796f9bb/
accessed 7 November 2018; NOS, ‘Embryo’s zijn mensen, die kweek je niet’ (NOS,
27 May 2016) nos.nl/artikel/2107661-embryo-s-zijn-mensen-die-kweek-je-niet.html
accessed 7 November 2018.
138 Parliamentary document Kamerstukken II 2016/17, 29 323, no 110, 2.
139 Ibid.
140 COGEM/Health Council of the Netherlands, Editing Human DNA: Moral and Social
Implications of Germline Genetic Modification (Bilthoven 2017).
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would be able to eliminate serious diseases, also in the few cases in which
PGD would no longer be an option.
Additionally, they discussed several arguments that have been raised against
human germline editing based on human dignity, designer babies and slip-
pery slopes, and equality and justice, and offered counterarguments for each,
finding that using human germline editing to eliminate grave diseases does
not conflict with human dignity but rather respects it, as the future child and
future generations will be permanently rid of unhealthy genes. Moreover,
both organizations argued that if the Dutch legislator does not prohibit the use
of NGT, then it should also not prohibit the use of germline editing to prevent
serious diseases.
Both Schippers’s proposal and the advisory report were discussed in media
at length.141 Both positive142 and negative143 reactions were expressed by several
ethicists and legal scholars. Moreover, several important organizations and
institutions responded. The Dutch Council of State (Raad van State),
a constitutionally established advisory body to the Dutch government and
States General, was very critical. In its advisory report on the Minister’s
proposal, it wrote that it is not convinced of the necessity of lifting the ban
on creating embryos to enable research in the field of reproductive
technologies.144 Moreover, it stressed the importance of the principle of
respect for human life and human dignity, and pointed out that Schippers’s
policy could have certain negative side effects for society.
Similarly, the Rathenau Instituut, a government-sponsored organization
that performs research relating to the societal aspects of science, innovation
and new technologies, expressed concerns about these developments. In
141 E.g.MKeulemans, ‘Gezondheidsraad adviseert: legaliseer het genetisch bewerken van embryo’s’,
(Volkskrant, 28March 2017) www.volkskrant.nl/wetenschap/gezondheidsraad-adviseert-legaliseer
-het-genetisch-bewerken-van-embryo-s~b53e7492/ accessed 24 November 2018.
142 E.g. A Bredenoord, quoted in: D Waterval, ‘Nederland is volwassen genoeg om aanpassing
DNA te reguleren’, (Trouw, 29 March 2017) www.trouw.nl/home/-nederland-is-volwassen-
genoeg-om-aanpassing-dna-s-te-reguleren-~a53c82f9/ accessed 24 October 2018; Y Buruma,
‘Genetische modificatie. Fundamentele vragen voor het recht’ (2017) 1754 NJB 32, 2310;
EJ Oldekamp and MC de Vries, ‘Nieuwe procreatietechnieken. Achterhaalde juridische
kaders?’ in Nieuwe techniek, nieuwe zorg. Preadviezen (Handelingen Vereniging voor
Gezondheidsrecht. Deel 2018–1) (Den Haag: Sdu 2018) 15–88.
143 D Pessers, ‘De aanbidding van het DNA’ (De Groene Amsterdammer, 6 September 2017)
www.groene.nl/artikel/de-aanbidding-van-het-dna last accessed 24October 2018; B van Beers,
‘We zijn blij met de assemblage van onze iZoon: Designbaby’s of de voortplanting van de
toekomst’ (2018) 6 De Groene Amsterdammer 42; T Vaessen, ‘D66 maakt weg vrij voor
industriële fabricage van baby’s’ (Financieele Dagblad, 22 December 2017) fd.nl/weekend/
1229975/d66-maakt-weg-vrij-voor-industriele-fabricage-van-baby-s accessed 24 October 2018.
144 Raad van State, ‘Advice W13.16.0202/III’ (4 November 2016) www.raadvanstate.nl/adviezen/
zoeken-in-adviezen/tekst-advies.html?id=13060 accessed 24 October 2018.
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a report entitled ‘Rules for the Digital Human Park’,145 the Rathenau Instituut
called for a broader discussion, in which more collective values and interests
also would be involved, such as the rights and interests of future generations,
human dignity and the protection of the human genome as the common
heritage of humanity. Clearly, the authors were inspired by German philoso-
pher Peter Sloterdijk’s famous essay Rules for the Human Zoo.146 Like
Sloterdijk, they argued that new technologies, such as germline editing and
persuasive technologies, could evolve into practices of breeding and taming
human beings. Hence, according to them, the possible prospect of a self-
domestication of the human species offers an important perspective for
debates on germline modification.
Both Schippers’s letters and the report written by the Health Council and
the Netherlands Commission on Genetic Modification remained undis-
cussed in Parliament for a long time. The reason is that in March 2017
elections took place. Parliamentary discussions on ‘controversial’ topics like
human germline editing were postponed until the new government was sworn
in September 2017. Schippers did not return as Minister of Health. She was
succeeded by Mr Hugo de Jonge, a member of Christian Democratic Appeal
(Christen-Democratisch Appèl – CDA). The coalition agreement, which
serves as the basis for the current government, immediately made clear that
Minister De Jonge will not continue Schippers’s line of policy with regard to
human gene editing and creating embryos for research.147 The coalition
agreement emphasized the need for further public debate about these issues
before further political decisions are made.148 This was confirmed through
several letters that De Jonge sent to Parliament in 2017 and 2018.149
Overall, in current debates on germline genome editing two conflicting
ethical perspectives seem to dominate in the Netherlands. The report ‘Rules
145 R Van Est and others, Regels voor het digitale mensenpark. ‘Telen’ en ‘temmen’ van de mens
via kiembaanmodificatie en persuasieve technologie (Den Haag: Rathenau Instituut 2017).
An English version was published earlier: Rules for the digital human park. Two paradigmatic
cases of breeding and taming human beings: human germline editing and persuasive technol-
ogy (11th Global Summit 2016) www.globalsummit-berlin2016.de/programme/GlobalSumm
it2016DiscussionPapers.pdf accessed 24 October 2018.
146 P Sloterdijk, ‘Rules for the Human Zoo: A response to the Letter on Humanism’ (2009) 27
Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 12.
147 The coalition agreement was translated in English, see ‘Confidence in the Future’, www
.kabinetsformatie2017.nl/documenten/verslagen/2017/10/10/coalition-agreement-confidence-
in-the-future, accessed 24 October 2018.
148 ‘Confidence in the Future’, 22.
149 Parliamentary documents Kamerstukken II 2017/2018, 34 775 XVI, no 46; Amendment
Parliamentary documents 2017/18, 1141, 1; Parliamentary documents Kamerstukken II 2017/
2018, 34 990, no 1.
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for the Digital Human Park’ calls these two opposing views the ‘human rights
regime’ and the ‘medical ethics regime’.150 The ‘human rights regime’ goes
back to the legal-ethical approach that underpins the founding international
conventions and declarations in the field of biolaw. The Council of Europe’s
Oviedo Convention and UNESCO’s Universal Declaration on the Human
Genome and Human Rights, each in its own way, embody the thought that
biomedical developments touch on the question of what it means to be
human and ‘that the misuse of biology and medicine may lead to acts
endangering human dignity’, to quote the Oviedo Convention’s recital.
This approach can be distinguished from the ‘medical ethics regime’,
which the Rathenau Instituut’s report describes as follows: ‘The basic question
in this regime is whether a particular intervention in the human body satisfies
criteria of safety, informed consent, and, in the context of reproductive
medicine, also parental rights and reproductive freedom. In these terms,
human germline engineering may be deemed ethically acceptable, especially
when a particular intervention may alleviate potential suffering of a (future)
human individual.’151 This line of thinking can, for example, be recognized in
the international calls for a moratorium on human gene editing from scientists
working in the field. These groups’ prime concerns are that ‘the precise effects
of genetic modification to an embryo may be impossible to know until after
birth’ and ‘potential problems may not surface for years’.152 Their main
recommendations are more research and better education of the public by
experts ‘about this new era of human biology’.153
The Embryo Act shares the same legal-ethical outlook as the Oviedo
Convention when it comes to human germline editing and research into
human germline editing. However, this prohibitive ‘human rights regime’
approach is under increasing pressure. Instead, the ‘medical ethics regime’
approach, which focuses on the prevention of clinical risks and the principle of
self-determination, is becoming more dominant in this context. Schippers’s
letters can serve as a good illustration of the current tendency to focus on safety
risks instead of the legal-ethical principles that are at stake. By proposing to lift the
ban on research embryos without first investigating whether IVM, IVG, NGT
and germline editing are the way forward in the first place, Schippers seems to
presuppose that the only possible moral objection against these technologies is
that they are not clinically safe yet. Yet, this approach ignores some of the most
150 Rules for the Digital Human Park (n 145) 16–17.
151 Ibid. 16.
152 E Lanphier and others, ‘Don’t edit the human germline’ (2015) 519 Nature 411.
153 DBaltimore and others, ‘A prudent path forward for genomic engineering and germline gene
modification’ (2015) 348:6230 Science 38.
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important questions raised by the prospect of germline genome editing.
Interestingly, the European Group on Ethics in Science and New
Technologies (EGE), which is an independent advisory body of the President
of the European Commission, warns exactly about this tendency in a 2016
statement on gene editing:
The EGE cautions against reducing the debate to safety issues and the
potential health risks or health benefits of gene editing technologies. Other
ethical principles such as human dignity, justice, equity, proportionality and
autonomy are clearly at stake and should be part of this necessary reflection
towards the international governance of gene editing.154
This brings us to a second line of critique on the manner in which the
public debate on germline editing currently plays out in the Netherlands.
From a human rights perspective, the legal principle of human dignity is of
central importance to the debate on germline editing. Yet, in many of the
policy documents, little reflection is offered on human dignity. A striking
example is the position paper on genome editing that was written by the
Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences. This paper does not make
any mention of human dignity.155 Instead, the Academy’s main concerns
about human germline applications are about various types of health risks.
The report of the Health Council and the Netherlands Commission on
Genetic Modification does engage with the principle of human dignity, albeit
quite briefly. However, its interpretation is strikingly one-dimensional. It is
common among scholars of bioethics and biolaw to distinguish between two
dimensions of, or perspectives on, human dignity: human dignity as ‘empower-
ment’ and human dignity as ‘constraint’.156 The first perspective understands
respect for human dignity as respect for personal autonomy and self-
determination. The second interprets human dignity as a principle that protects
individuals against dehumanization, objectification or commodification (even if
these individuals consent to their dehumanizing treatment). What seems to
underlie the ban on germline editing in the Oviedo Convention is mainly
the second view of human dignity.157 The Convention’s Explanatory Report, in
154 European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies, ‘Statement on gene editing’
(2016) ec.europa.eu/research/ege/pdf/gene_editing_ege_statement.pdf accessed 24October 2018.
155 Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, Position paper on genome editing
(Koninklijke Nederlandse Akademie Van Wetenschappen, November 2016) www.knaw.nl/
en/news/publications/genome-editing/@@download/pdf_file/Genome%20Editing%20Positi
on%20Paper%20KNAW%20November%202016.pdf accessed 24 October 2018.
156 Brownsword/Beyleveld,HumanDignity in Bioethics and Law (Oxford University Press 2001).
157 For a further discussion, see BC van Beers, ‘Imagining future people in biomedical law: From
technological utopias to legal dystopias within the regulation of human genetic modification
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its comments on Article 13, identifies as its ultimate fear the use of ‘intentional
modification of the human genome so as to produce individuals or entire groups
endowed with particular characteristics and required qualities’.158
The Health Council and the Netherlands Commission on Genetic
Modification, on the contrary, only highlight the other dimension of human
dignity: empowerment. According to the report, if human germline editing is
used to prevent suffering by removing the genetic cause of a disease, it should
be considered a form of respect for human dignity.159 From their perspective,
dignity is primarily about alleviating suffering.
Since Schippers presented her ideas on germline editing, the political
composition of the government has changed. It remains to be seen how this
will affect the political debate on germline editing in the Netherlands. It is
clear that this government is more cautious in its approach and prefers to await
further public and political debate about the issue. How the current govern-
ment intends to stimulate this debate is still unknown. It would be our
suggestion that, in order to make this debate more inclusive and balanced,
both the human rights perspective and the medical-ethical perspective should
be properly represented. This means that not only the safety risks of the
technology but also the legal and ethical principles that are at stake must be
discussed; that not only scientists but also citizens should be heard; that not
only individual but also collective interests and values should be addressed in
the discussion; and that human dignity should not only be understood as
respect for autonomy but also as protection against dehumanization.
technologies’, in M Ambrus, R Rayfuse and W Werner (eds.), Risk and the Regulation of
Uncertainty in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press) 117–140.
158 Explanatory Report to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Dignity of the
Human Being with Regard to the Application of Biology and Medicine: Convention on
Human Rights and Biomedicine (Explanatory Report), para 89.
159 COGEM/Health Council of the Netherlands, Editing Human DNA: Moral and Social
Implications of Germline Genetic Modification (Bilthoven 2017) 55.
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